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Supervisory Control for Opacity
Jérémy Dubreil, Philippe Darondeau, and Hervé Marchand
Abstract—In the field of computer security, a problem that
received little attention so far is the enforcement of confidentiality
properties by supervisory control. Given a critical system
that may leak confidential information, the problem consists in
designing a controller , possibly disabling occurrences of a fixed
subset of events of , so that the closed-loop system does
not leak confidential information. We consider this problem in
the case where is a finite transition system with set of events
  and an inquisitive user, called the adversary, observes a subset
  of  . The confidential information is the fact (when it is true)
that the trace of the execution of on  belongs to a regular set
  , called the secret. The secret is said to be opaque w.r.t.
(respectively, ) and   if the adversary cannot safely
infer this fact from the trace of the execution of (respectively,
) on  . In the converse case, the secret can be disclosed. We
present an effective algorithm for computing the most permissive
controller such that is opaque w.r.t. and   . This
algorithm subsumes two earlier algorithms working under the
strong assumption that the alphabet   of the adversary and the
set of events that the controller can disable are comparable.
Index Terms—Confidentiality, control, discrete event systems
(DES), opacity, partial observation, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE development of infrastructures like the Internet or themobile phone networks has led to the emergence of so-
phisticated on-line services providing information access or de-
cision taking facilities. Such networks are open by nature and
therefore vulnerable to malicious users. All the same, security
and confidence in security are essential to distant services such
as e-voting, on-line payment, or medical information storage.
Such services handle indeed critical information that should be
neither erased nor corrupted nor leaked to unauthorized users.
Confidence in the security of a service relies on and requires
some certification of security. Manual validation is expensive,
may be impossible for large systems, and is permeable to mis-
takes. The development of automatic tools serving to analyze
or to ensure the security of services has become crucial to dis-
cover and avoid security breaches. In this context, there has been
growing interest in the formal verification of security properties
[1]–[3] and in their model-based testing [4]–[8].1
Manuscript received January 13, 2009; revised June 19, 2009 and August 24,
2009. First published February 02, 2010; current version published May 12,
2010. This work was supported in part by the Politess RNRT project. Recom-
mended by Associate Editor S. Reveliotis.
The authors are with the INRIA, Centre Rennes-Bretagne Atlantique,
Rennes, France (e-mail: jeremy.dubreil@inria.fr; jeremy.dubreil@aitb.org;
darondeau@inria.fr; hmarchan@inria.fr).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TAC.2010.2042008
1Not mention works on cryptography that fall out of the scope of this paper.
Security properties are generally classified into three different
categories [9]:
• availability (a user can always perform legal actions);
• integrity (a user can never perform illegal actions);
• confidentiality (a user cannot discover or infer the secret
information).
Consider the case of an e-voting system. Ensuring that the votes
cannot be modified by a third party is a concern of integrity.
Ensuring that every elector can vote is a concern of availability.
Ensuring that is not possible for a third party to discover the vote
of an elector is a concern of confidentiality.
In this paper, we focus on confidentiality and especially on
opacity, a central notion that was introduced in [10] and adapted
to transition systems in [11]. Given a transition system, con-
sider an observation map that projects runs to observations, and
a specific subset of runs called the secret, with the meaning that
the observed behavior of the system should never disclose when
its actual behavior belongs to this set. The secret is said to be
opaque if the projection of every run in this set coincides with
the projection of some run outside the set. Then, an adversary
who observes the run of the system cannot safely infer from
this (partial) observation that the run belongs to the secret. More
specific notions of opacity, like initial opacity or K-step opacity
have been introduced in [12], [13]. At the same time, the no-
tion of opacity defined in [10] is general enough to allow other
notions like anonymity (strong or weak as defined in [14]) and
strong non-deterministic non-interference [15] to be expressed
as opacity for suitable secrets and observation maps [11]. Note
that opacity is more or less dual to diagnosability [16], [17], that
consists in deciding whether the actual run of the system belongs
to the secret from a bounded extension of this run.
Our purpose in this paper is not to model-check transition
systems for opacity properties but to enforce such properties
on transition systems by supervisory control. According to Ra-
madge and Wonham’s theory presented in [18], [19], the aim of
supervisory control is to enforce a safety property on a transition
system. This is achieved by defining a map that determines after
each incomplete run of the system the set of actions which may
be taken without compromising the safety property. All uncon-
trollable actions must be in this set. This control map is generally
expected to be as permissible as possible, i.e. no unnecessary
restriction should be imposed on the system. If successful ter-
mination of runs is taken into account, the control map should
moreover be non-blocking, meaning that it should not prevent
the system from eventually reaching some final state. Within
Ramadge and Wonham’s framework, the computational aspects
of supervisory control have been investigated mainly for finite
transition systems and regular safety properties. In this case, the
control map can be computed in a regular form, yielding a fi-
nite state supervisor. The expected controlled system is then the
product of the uncontrolled system and supervisor .
0018-9286/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE
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Applying supervisory control to enforce confidentiality prop-
erties is an emerging field of research. In [20], the author adapts
the decentralized supervisory control theory in order to ensure
the Chinese Wall Policy, whereas in [21], the authors focus on
(bisimulation-based) strong non-deterministic non-interference
properties. Attempts to adapt supervisory control to opacity
have been made in [22]–[24]. In these works, one considers
a finite and deterministic labeled transition system over an
alphabet , a regular set (the secret) and a subset
(the alphabet of the adversary), and one searches for
a finite state supervisor enforcing the opacity of w.r.t. the
natural projection from to (by the opacity of we mean
the opacity of the set of runs with traces in ). In this setting,
represents a system running in the scope of an inquisitive
adversary. The adversary observes all actions in and tries
to infer from these partial observations the knowledge that the
trace of the run of is in the secret set . For instance, may
be the driver of a semi-autonomous agent that travels through
a finite network, and is the set of incoming paths to a region
of the network that should not be identified as the current
region of the agent without compromising efficiency (the task
of the agent may be to keep watch on a shopping center with
two types of stores, specialized either in jewels or in candies,
and thieves should not know when jewels stores are without
supervision) or continuity of the service (the agent should not
fall in an ambush). For another illustration, may be a voting
system with a finite set of voters, numbered from 1 to , where
the sequence of voters is random and may be observed (votes
are not observable). Suppose that voting may be stopped at any
time when it is certain that further voting would not change
the result, which is then published. Let elementary votes be
represented as pairs or . Let , respectively, be
the sets of sequences in which the last vote is , respectively,
. Enforcing the joint opacity of and prevents from
stopping whenever this would reveal some vote or
.
One subtlety lays in the additional assumption that the ad-
versary knows exactly the system and the supervisor . This
means that new confidential information may be inferred by the
adversary from the knowledge of and the partial observation
of the run of the controlled system, and to avoid such leakage,
one must iterate the controller construction. Hence the exact
problem is to find a supervisor that enforces the opacity of
w.r.t. and the projection from to , and this is
an intrinsically circular problem because the control objective
cannot be expressed without an explicit reference to the con-
troller (this is not true when the control objective is a safety
property).
The non-blocking property of the supervisor (another circular
problem) was ignored in the works cited above. We shall not
address this issue in the present paper, where we still consider
finite transition systems, regular secrets and natural projections.
The intrinsic circularity of the supervisory control problem
for opacity makes it impossible to give a general solution to
this problem by direct application of Ramadge and Wonham’s
methods.2 These methods were designed for enforcing integrity
2By Ramadge and Wonham’s methods, we mean in general finite iterative
methods for computing the greatest fixpoints of contractive operators on regular
languages, enforcing separately or jointly behavioral properties such as safety,
non-blockingness and the like by successive restrictions until these properties
finally hold.
properties on plants. Nevertheless, the Ramadge and Wonham’s
theory can be used directly for enforcing opacity properties
when (1) or (2) where
respectively, denote the subsets of actions that can be
controlled respectively, observed by the supervisor [24]. In
both cases, the language of the optimal supervisor may be
computed by a first fixpoint iteration, yielding the supremal
sublanguage of with respect to which is opaque,
followed by a second fixpoint iteration, yielding the supremal
controllable and normal sublanguage of . Conditions less
restrictive than (2) have been elaborated in [23] to the same
effect.
In the remaining situations, a non-trivial adaptation of
Ramadge and Wonham’s methods is necessary. Some of
the difficulties encountered are described in [24] where a
specific control synthesis algorithm is defined for the case
. The purpose of this paper is to propose
a new algorithm producing a most permissive and regular
supervisory control for opacity in the more general case where
both and but and are not necessarily
comparable.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section II
fixes some notations, introduces the notion of opacity and
presents the opacity control problem. Section III provides a
reduction of the opacity control problem to the same problem
under full observation. Section IV presents informally the
constructions needed to synthesize the controller. Section V
is the core of the paper and presents the detailed construction
and the formal justification of a solution to the opacity control
problem. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations and Definitions
Henceforth, is a finite alphabet of actions (denoted
and the like), is a deterministic transition
system labeled in , with a finite set of states , an initial state
, and a partial transition map . A
(partial or incomplete) run of is a finite non-empty sequence
alternatively consisting of states
and actions such that is defined for
and it is equal to for .
The trace of the run is the word .
The trace of the empty run is the empty word . The language
of is the set of all traces of runs of and it is denoted .
As is a deterministic labeled transition system (or LTS), runs
and traces of runs are in bijective correspondence. The words
in may therefore, by an abuse of terminology, be called
traces of .
Opacity control aims at preventing an inquisitive user, called
the adversary, from obtaining or inferring confidential informa-
tion on the execution of from a partial observation of this run.
To model the partial observation of runs by the adversary, we let
denote the subset of actions of that the adversary can
observe, and we use the natural projection de-
fined inductively on words with ,
if , and otherwise. For any words
, denotes the fact that ,
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and denotes the class of w.r.t. the in-
duced equivalence. Thus, is the set of traces of
that the adversary cannot distinguish from . denotes
the deterministic LTS which is computed from by first re-
placing all transitions labeled in with -transitions and
next applying the subset construction on the relabeled version
of . The construction is recalled hereafter.3
Definition 1: Let . Then
where and is the
inductive closure of the set under the partial transition
map .
In order to match the system with the dynamic estimation
of its current state by the adversary, we shall consider the par-
allel composition . This composition operation is
recalled below.
Definition 2: Let , 2 be two
LTSs. Their parallel composition is the deterministic
transition system as follows:
if
if
if
otherwise.
Note that a controlled system might also be written
since is indeed the parallel composition of the plant
and the controller .
B. The Definition of Opacity
Consider an LTS over and a subalphabet . The
alphabet is the set of actions supplied to the user for inter-
acting synchronously with , i.e. for observing the runs of .
One wants to hide from the user some confidential property of
runs, e.g. that a run has never visited some state, or that some
action has always been immediately followed in the run by
some other action , or that some high-level action occurred in
the run (according to the terminology for non-interference used
in [15]). Such a confidential property of runs may be represented
abstractly as a non-empty and regular subset , which
we call a secret. As the user is possibly inquisitive, we call him
the adversary.
If, for some trace of , belongs to but does
not belong to , then the adversary knows from the
observation of the trace that this trace belongs to , i.e.
the trace discloses the secret to the adversary. In the converse
case, no confidential information is leaked and the secret is
said to be opaque w.r.t. and . Let us state a more precise
definition of opacity.
Definition 3: For , let be the
set of words such that . Then is opaque
w.r.t. and if .
Remark 1: Equivalently, is opaque w.r.t. and iff
.
3We use freely the inductive extension           defined with
     and          for   . We use as well the
additive extensions of   to sets of states and/or to sets of words.
Fig. 1. Case of non-opacity.
Remark 2: If is any family of languages and is opaque
w.r.t. and for any , then is opaque w.r.t. arbitrary
unions of languages in and .
Example 1: Let be the automaton de-
picted in Fig. 1, thus , , is
defined by the labeled edges, , and
(the traces in lead to the squared configurations in Fig. 1). Let
. Then is not opaque w.r.t. and , since
e.g. for the observation , the only possible trace is .
Similarly, for the observation , the only possible traces are
and which both belong to the secret . Finally, the
trace belongs to but it does not disclose the secret, since
and does not belong to .
For another illustration of the concept of opacity, imagine that
models a hardware/software system with a bug that cannot be
fixed because it is in the hardware and is the set of traces of
all runs in which the bug occurs, i.e. the secret is the run-time
extension of the bug. If is opaque w.r.t. , then a user
who can only observe the actions in will never identify any
consequence of the bug. In the converse case, the best one can
do is to hide the bug by wrapping in a software interface,
restricting the behavior of and ensuring in this way that and
hence the bug cannot be disclosed any more. This can always be
done in view of the following proposition.
Proposition 1 ([22]): Given a system and a set of traces
, there always exists a supremal prefix-closed sublanguage
of such that is opaque w.r.t. and , namely the
language .
The proof of this proposition follows from the definition of
opacity and Remark 2.
C. Opacity Control Problem
Given a system and a secret , our goal is to enforce the
opacity of on by supervisory control. The search space for
possible controls over is determined by two subsets of , a
subset of controllable actions and a subset of observable
actions. It is assumed that after a run of with trace , the
information available for controlling the next action of is the
observed trace , where is the natural projection from
to .
A control is a map from observed traces to
subsets of such that only the supersets of can
appear in the range of (this restriction reflects that a controller
Authorized licensed use limited to: UR Rennes. Downloaded on May 17,2010 at 09:20:04 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
1092 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, VOL. 55, NO. 5, MAY 2010
can never disable any uncontrollable action). Applying the con-
trol to means disabling after all actions which do not
belong to . We let denote the induced restric-
tion of the language generated by under the control .
Remark 3: If is a (possibly infinite) LTS such that
, where is any LTS such that ,
then . The LTS is called a controller,
and the parallel composition is often written to
stress this interpretation. Indeed, and determine each other
up to the constraint . So, one can work
indifferently with control maps or with controllers .
The problem we want to solve may be described roughly as
follows.
Problem 1: Given a finite deterministic transition system
labeled over , a regular subset (the secret), and three
subalphabets , and of , compute a most permissive
control such that is opaque w.r.t. and .
A classical Ramadge and Wonham’s theorem states that a
prefix-closed sublanguage of may be obtained as the
induced restriction of the language generated by under some
control (in formulas, ) if and only if is con-
trollable and observable according to the definitions below (for
a complete presentation of supervisory control, the reader is re-
ferred e.g. to [25]).
Definition 4: A prefix-closed language is con-
trollable w.r.t. and if .
Definition 5: A prefix-closed language is observ-
able w.r.t. , and if, for any with identical
observations and for any controllable action
, .
Another classical theorem states that if every controllable ac-
tion is observable, i.e. in the case , then a prefix-closed
language is observable if and only it is normal according to
the definition below.
Definition 6: A prefix-closed language is normal
w.r.t. and if .
Prefix-closedness, controllability, and normality are pre-
served under arbitrary unions of languages. Using this fact, one
may show that under the assumption , any language
has a supremal prefix-closed, controllable and observable
sublanguage. Using Remark 2, it should moreover be clear that
a formal solution to Problem 1 is obtained by defining
as the union of all languages such that is
prefix-closed, controllable and observable, and is opaque
w.r.t. and . Unfortunately, this does not indicate that
or can be effectively computed. It should moreover
be noted that, if the conditions stated above are fulfilled only
for (the empty language that does not even contain
the empty word), then there exists no solution to Problem
1 (because for any ). The opacity of w.r.t.
and is a sufficient condition to the existence of
solutions to Problem 1.4 A list of alternative conditions under
which effective algorithms have been proposed for computing
the most permissive opacity control is stated in the following
proposition.
4This condition is not necessary. For instance, let      
and    with    ,    , and     , then  is not
opaque w.r.t.      but it is opaque w.r.t.   !
Proposition 2: Given a finite transition system and a reg-
ular secret , assume that is opaque w.r.t. and
. In each of the following four situations, one can effectively
compute the most permissive control enforcing the opacity of
w.r.t. and :
1) [24];
2) and
[23];
3) [24];
4) [24].
In cases (1), (2) and (3), is obtained by com-
puting first the supremal sublanguage of
with respect to which is opaque (given by Proposition 1),
and next the supremal controllable and normal sublanguage
of the former. In case (4), on ac-
count of the assumption that the adversary knows exactly the
control map, it would be necessary to iterate further the two
operations and in alternation, but it has
been shown in [24] that such an iteration may not stabilize, and
a non-trivial adaptation of Ramadge and Wonham’s methods
was in fact necessary to compute with an algorithm
that always terminates.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that as in all
cases listed in Proposition 2. We also suppose that ,
meaning that a controller has at least as precise information as
the adversary on the actual run of . But we do not suppose that
and are comparable, thus jointly extending conditions
(2), (3) and (4) of Proposition 2. The exact problem which we
want to solve may finally be stated as follows:
Problem 2 (Opacity Control Problem): Given a finite deter-
ministic transition system labeled over , a regular subset
(the secret), a subalphabet (the actions which
a controller can observe), and two arbitrary subalphabets
(the actions which a controller can disable) and
(the actions visible to the adversary), let denote the set of
non-empty prefix-closed sublanguages of such that
is controllable w.r.t. and , is normal w.r.t. and
, and is opaque w.r.t. and . The problem is twofold.
i) Show that it is decidable whether is empty.
ii) Show that for non-empty , the union of all lan-
guages in is a regular language , and construct from
and a finite state machine generating .
At this stage, we would like to indicate briefly potential appli-
cations. In the security literature, opacity is usually considered
in the context of infinite systems, including for instance un-
bounded Petri nets. As opacity is not decidable in general [11],
the best one can do is often model-checking systems for suffi-
cient opacity conditions. A complementary technique would be
to enforce opacity by supervisory control on finite abstractions
of infinite systems and then to lift control to the original systems
for subsequent model-checking. A field of direct application
of regular opacity control is the guidance of semi-autonomous
agents traveling through finite networks, with the objective of
preventing current positions from being known to adversaries
that receive partial information from sensors. The technical de-
velopment presented in Section V will be illustrated with a re-
duced example of this kind.
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III. A REDUCTION TO OPACITY CONTROL
UNDER FULL OBSERVATION
We show in this section that solving the Opacity Control
Problem under the assumption (full observation) in-
duces a general solution of the Opacity Control Problem. The
parameter of the Opacity Control Problem will therefore be
eliminated from the subsequent sections where the problem is
afforded a solution.
Define (the set spec-
ified in the statement of the Opacity Control Problem).
Let where
. Note that , and is a
regular language.
Proposition 3: Let , then .
Proof: , and the non-
emptiness and prefix-closeness of entail similar properties
for .
We show that is controllable w.r.t. and .
Let and such that .
As is prefix-closed, for some
such that . Let for some .
Then . As is normal w.r.t. and ,
. As and ,
by controllability of . Therefore, as
required.
The projected language is certainly normal w.r.t.
and , because .
We show finally that is opaque w.r.t. and . Let
, then for some
and by definition of , . As is opaque w.r.t. and
, for some . Let , then
, , and
because , , and .
Proposition 4: Let , then .
Proof: Let , then ,
is prefix-closed because and are prefix-closed, and
because is a non-empty subset of .
We show that is controllable w.r.t. and . Let
with and . If , then
because . Suppose now that .
Then belongs to , , and
. As is controllable w.r.t. and ,
. Therefore, , and since ,
as required.
It follows directly from the definition
that is normal w.r.t. and .
We show finally that is opaque w.r.t. and . Let
and let , then , hence
. If is not included
in , then and thus for some
. If is included in ,
then by definition of this set. As is opaque w.r.t.
and , for some . By definition
of , for some . Now
and , hence by definition of
. Therefore, . Finally, because
and .
Proposition 5: The Opacity Control Problem with the pa-
rameters is equivalent to the same
problem with the parameters .
Proof: In view of Propositions 3 and 4, if and only
if . Note that both operations and
are monotone. Moreover, the fol-
lowing relations hold for all and (establishing
thus a Galois connection between and ):
• ;
• ;
• ;
• .
One deduces the following. If then for any
, , hence
. If
then for any , , hence
. Thus, if and only if . As both operators
and preserve regular languages, the proof
of the proposition follows.
Based on Proposition 5, whenever , one can
reformulate the opacity control problem in terms of the abstract
system induced by the observation map and a new secret
derived from , solve the problem in this abstract setting,
and lift up the solution to the original setting as
.
IV. AN INFORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we sketch the intuitions under the methods
that will be employed for solving Problem 2. Henceforth, based
on Proposition 5, we assume w.l.o.g. that . Moreover,
we assume that the transition system recognizes the secret ,
i.e. such that for any ,
iff is defined and iff . This second
condition, even though it does not hold for arbitrary and ,
always holds for the parallel composition of and a complete
deterministic automaton recognizing .
Let denote the set of all non-empty prefix-closed and con-
trollable languages such that is opaque w.r.t.
and . It was observed in Section II that, if differs from the
empty set, then is in . We want to construct a finite
automaton that generates , showing that this language is
regular and providing as a by-product the most permissive con-
trol enforcing the opacity of w.r.t. and . In
case when , no control on can enforce the opacity
of . In order to avoid this special case, we assume henceforth
that and is defined only for .
This property may always be enforced on by adding if neces-
sary a dummy transition from a dummy initial state to the actual
initial state of . In this way, the condition is replaced
equivalently with the condition . The latter condition
may of course be decided upon from any automaton gener-
ating .
As is the set of traces of recognized by the accepting
states in , a trace discloses the secret to the
adversary if . Therefore, if
for every . The usual method for testing
this is to construct an LTS as
indicated in Definition 1, and to check that no reachable state
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is a subset of . In case when for some
, a first and necessary step towards computing is
to compute the LTS , thus matching the
system with the dynamic estimation of its current state by the
adversary. This LTS, equipped with the set of accepting states
, recognizes exactly the set of traces which disclose
the secret .
Let us explain more precisely the contribution brought by
the LTS to the construction of a control map enforcing
the opacity of . Define . The initial state
of is the pair defined with ,
and the reachability set of is the inductive closure
of the set under the partial transition map
(where ).
When a run with trace is performed in , the matching
run of leads to a pair where is the state reached
by and is the most accurate estimate of
that can be computed by an adversary knowing and .
Therefore, the adversary can disclose the secret if and only if
has at least one loosing path, that is a path leading to a loosing
configuration such that . Here and in the sequel,
the term configuration is used as a synonym of state for all
automata with sets of states included in , while the term
state is reserved to the elements of .
Suppose the adversary can win. One must impose on some
control such that, for any in and for any action
, if and is a loosing con-
figuration of for some , then . Traces
are fully observable, hence the corresponding config-
urations of may be used to determine the values
of . It suffices indeed to track controllable actions back-
wards from loosing configurations on acyclic paths of , and to
define such that the last controllable transition is disabled on
each loosing path. Then, no loosing configuration of can be
reached in , and by construction, is a
superset of .
However, may be larger than , because the con-
figuration reached in by a trace
does not always reflect the most accurate estimate
of for an adversary knowing , and . As
is strictly smaller than , may indeed be strictly
larger than , and if this smaller set is in-
cluded in , then the adversary can still disclose the secret
in the controlled system since he knows exactly the control
map .
At this stage, it would be helpful to compute an automaton
generating such that each trace leads
from the initial state of to the configuration given
by and .5 Unfortu-
nately, such an automaton does not exist in general. One reason
among others is that two traces inducing dif-
ferent control values and might nevertheless lead to
the same configuration , thus preventing from gener-
ating .
Example 2: To illustrate this point, consider again the system
and the secret defined in Example 1. Assume now that
5This was the construction used in [24] to deal with case (4) in Proposition 1.
Fig. 2.     and        .
and . The LTSs and
are shown in Fig. 2.
The loosing configurations that disclose are squared.
The control must disable the last controllable transition
on each loosing path as indicated in dashed lines, hence
, , and . In particular,
and . However, an adversary who
knows that is controlled by computes the same state esti-
mate {1} for and . Now, if one lets accordingly
in , then one
reaches a confused situation: on the one hand,
should be defined because , and on the other hand,
should be undefined because !
Furthermore, even if the construction of from , in a first
stage, and of from and , in a second stage, were pos-
sible, the computation of would be very slow, as we explain
below. Given a trace with ,
suppose that such that and
is not a configuration of . Suppose that from every state
, exists in exactly one transition where
and all the transitions from states are labeled
with the same action . Although it was already
evident from (as opposed to ) that, if an adversary ever
gets the estimate of , then the action must be
control-disabled after , this fact is ignored in the definition of
the control since is not a configuration of .
Example 3: Back to example 2, one may see that if, after
control is imposed on , the configuration (1,{1}) may be
reached in , then the secret will be disclosed by the trace
in the controlled system . It is thus ultimately necessary
to disable at configuration (1,{1}) (which solves at the same
time the confusion encountered in Example 2).
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In order to cope with these shortcomings, we will replace au-
tomata defined over subsets of with partial maps
such that either or it is unde-
fined. Each partial map generates a corresponding automaton
with the initial state . The reachability set of the gen-
erated automaton is the inductive closure of the set
under the partial transition map
defined from as follows. Let be de-
fined inductively with for
. Let denote also the additive extension of the latter map
to sets of states and to languages. We define
with , if , and
otherwise.
Consider e.g. the automaton . We will
replace this automaton with the partial transition map de-
fined with . The map generates from
an automaton isomorphic to . The isomorphism
maps each state of to a similar state
where the condensed state estimate is equal to
if and otherwise to . Note that
the map may also serve to generate sequences of transitions
from initial configurations that
cannot be reached in but may play a role later on during the
iterative computation of the optimal control.
Continuing to mimic the approach in which a first control
function was derived from , we will replace the computation
of by the computation of a partial map
, such that will be either equal to or
undefined. The latter case will occur whenever is controllable
and the configuration discloses the
secret, i.e. when all states reached in by firing sequences in
from states in are in . The automaton generated by
the map from can now play the role that we had
assigned to our ghost automaton .
Proceeding similarly from , we will construct an in-
ductive sequence of partial maps such that
or it is undefined. These maps
induce a corresponding sequence of finite automata ,
generated from , with decreasing languages
. As there exist finitely many partial maps
from to , the decreasing sequence stabi-
lizes, i.e. for some . Let and
for the least such , then we will prove that ,
thus showing that the most permissive control enforcing the
opacity of is regular.6
We would like to complete this informal presentation of the
results and constructions stated in Section V by explaining
a little more the intuitions under state estimates in pairs
. In such pairs, is best envisaged as the set of
states that an adversary feels may have reached immediately
after the last action he has observed in some trace
of with partially observed prefix . Suppose the adversary
moreover knows that the control imposed on after his last
observed action in agrees with , i.e. that behaves
according to the sequences of transitions defined by from
6We recall that   is always non-empty owing to the assumptions made in
the beginning of this section.
the configuration . Then, the estimate provides him
enough information to determine all states that might have been
reached in under the same control by executing arbitrary
traces such that and . The reason why
we have chosen to work with condensed state estimates is that
this facilitates greatly the construction of the partial transition
map from the control map . For any , the state
estimate in is indeed the set of
states that an adversary believes may have reached under the
control after the last action in the trace .
Finally, we would like to give intuitions about the structure
of the automaton . The set of reachable states of this au-
tomaton may be partitioned into disjoint subsets such that
if and only if . For each , the full
restriction of induced on is isomorphic to a subau-
tomaton of , where the isomorphism maps
to . The automaton may therefore be seen as a mode
automaton, with one mode per estimate . In each mode , the
automaton exerts state based control on until, at some
state , it enables some action which the adversary
is aware of. Then jumps to a new mode , reflecting the
new condensed estimate gained by the adversary, and it enters
at such that in . The new mode is
. Note that the adversary’s view of
is isomorphic to the quotient of obtained by removing first
all transitions with labels in and then collapsing to a
single state for each mode .
V. THE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT
Let with and unde-
fined for ,
and . Throughout the section,
denotes a partial map such that is
either equal to or undefined. Let us recall the following.
Definition 7: Given , define induc-
tively and
for and . Let
be the partial transition map on such
that is given by ,
if , and otherwise.
For , define inductively and
. Let denote the au-
tomaton which is generated by the partial transition map from
the initial state . Thus
where is the closure of the set under . Finally
let .
Remark 4: by definition of .
Remark 5: If in the sense that is defined and
equal to whenever the latter is defined, then for any
, entails that
for some . Therefore,
.
Example 4: Let be the transition system depicted in Fig. 3,
with , , , and
.
Let be the partial map defined according
to the arcs of the picture. may be seen as a representation
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Fig. 3.  .
of all sequences of possible moves of an agent in a three storey
building with a south wing and a north wing, both equipped with
lifts and both connected by a corridor at each floor. Moreover,
there is a staircase that leads from the first floor in the south
wing to the third floor in the north wing. The agent starts from
the first floor in the south wing. He can walk up the stairs or
walk through the corridors from south to north without any
control. The lifts can be used several times one floor upwards
and at most once one floor downwards altogether. The
moves of the lifts are controllable. Thus and
. The secret is that the agent is either at the second floor
in the south wing or at the third floor in the north wing. The
adversary may gather the exact subsequence of moves in
from sensors, but he cannot observe the upwards moves
of the lifts. Thus and .
Let be the map defined with
. The automaton defined from is
depicted in Fig. 4. Each configuration of the automaton
is represented with in the first line and with the list of elements
of in the second line. For instance
In fact,
• ;
• ;
• .
Similarly
because
Fig. 4.   .
In contrast
because .
All other examples presented in the section are continuations
of Example 4.
Throughout the section, we let with
. The following three lemmas show that if a
sequence of transitions , ,
is generated from using the transition map
, then for each , is the best estimate of
the state that the adversary can obtain from
and the knowledge that .
Lemma 1: Let and ,
then .
Proof: We use an induction on the length of . If this
length is zero, i.e. , then and
by Definition 7, hence . Assume now that the lemma
holds when has length , and consider with
. Let and such
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that and , hence .
By the induction hypothesis, if we let and
, then . By Definition 7, if we
let and then
and , hence
. Now and
. As , by Definition 7,
and , hence .
Example 5: To illustrate the previous lemma, we can see that
and
have the same condensed state estimate.
Lemma 2: .
Proof: If , then and the prop-
erty to show coincides with the assumed property of . If
with , let . One may
assume by induction on words that , thus
for some and . Then
. One proceeds by cases. Suppose that
, then entails
and the desired result follows from .
Suppose that , then entails
and therefore . The desired result
follows from .
Example 6: Consider , then
, and .
Lemma 3: Let and , then
and jointly entail for
some such that .
Proof: We use an induction on the length of . Let
have length zero. By Definition 7, , hence
for some , and .
By Definition 7,
as desired. Assume now that the proposition holds when
has length , and consider with .
Let such that and ,
hence . Let . By Defini-
tion 7, . As ,
for some and . As
, for some
and . As has length , the in-
duction hypothesis applies to and
to . Therefore,
for some such that . Now
, hence
, establishing the lemma.
Example 7: We have ,
, and .
We will now investigate which words in actually dis-
close the secret to the adversary, and how one can remedy
these security failures. First, let us introduce a definition.
Definition 8: Given a partial map ,
let be the
associated set of loosing estimates, and for any in
such that , let
be the set of loosing traces w.r.t. state of , adversary’s state
estimate and control .
Example 8: Given that for all
, contains exactly one loosing estimate, namely
the singleton set {11}. Thus for instance, , , belong
to . Note that {5} is not a loosing estimate,
because .
The subset of words in that disclose the secret may
now be recognized by the automaton (see Definition 7)
equipped with the set of accepting states , as stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 6: For any , iff
.
Proof: Let such that . Let
, and let . By
Lemma 3, for some . As
and , we have .
As , it follows that . There-
fore, . To show the converse implication,
let , hence
. By Lemma 1, for any ,
if we let then .
By Lemma 2, . Therefore,
.
Proposition 7: If , then
Proof: Let , then by definition,
with . By Proposition
6, . To prove the converse inclusion relation,
consider such that and .
Let . By Proposition 6,
, hence . Now
, hence .
Proposition 7 tells us that, if
for some trace and some partial map
, then for any , if an adversary gets the state
estimate immediately after the trace has been executed in
, then he can infer from the projection of the sub-
sequent trace executed in that is in the secret set .
More generally, even though the configuration may not be
reachable in , if and
for some and , then . The reasons
why things should be so have been explained and illustrated in
Section IV.
Based on Proposition 7, we immediately have the following.
Corollary 1: If for every configuration
reached in , then
, i.e. is opaque w.r.t. and .
We have now in hands all elements needed to compute
such that and
is the largest controllable sublanguage of
with this property.
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Fig. 5.   .
Fig. 6.   .
Definition 9: Given , let be
the partial map such that
• is undefined if and
— either
— or for ,
• otherwise.
Example 9: Let . We restrict our attention to
pairs such that for some reachable configuration
of , which is enough for computing . Then
is undefined for and or
for and any . Similarly,
is undefined for and . This is so because
and is not controllable. The resulting
automaton is depicted in Fig. 5.
It is important to note that the emptiness of the set
may be checked on the finite automaton generated by the
partial transition map from the initial state .
Definition 10: Let for the least such that
where and is the map
defined with .
Example 10: Given that
, contains exactly
one loosing estimate, namely the singleton set {1}. Thus,
and is undefined. The
automaton is depicted in Fig. 6. The reader may verify
that .
The partial map is well defined since for all and
there exist finitely many partial maps . Note
that , thus is a controllable sublanguage
of . It may then be shown by an induction on that
is a controllable sublanguage of for all . Indeed, by
Definition 9, if and is the longest prefix
of in , then for some action .
The following propositions show that the language
is the largest controllable sublanguage of such that
is opaque w.r.t. and .
Proposition 8: is opaque w.r.t. and .
Proof: Let , hence . Assume for
contradiction that is not opaque w.r.t. and . Then
there exists such that . By Proposi-
tion 6, . We claim that . In order
to establish this property, assume for contradiction that
with and . Let
and , then by Proposi-
tion 7, . As , by Definition
9, is undefined. As , it is
impossible that . It follows from this contradic-
tion that . Recalling that , we observe
now that necessarily , because and is
undefined for all . Now since it
has been assumed that , hence it is impossible that
. It follows from this second contradiction that
is opaque w.r.t. and .
Proposition 9: Let be any prefix-closed and controllable
sublanguage of such that is opaque w.r.t. and .
Then for all .
Proof: In order to establish the proposition, we assume that
for some and we search for a contradiction. As
for all , we can moreover assume that is
the least integer such that . As , we
have . Let be a minimal word w.r.t. the prefix order in
. As is prefix-closed, . Let with
. As has no strict prefix in , necessarily
. Thus, , , and
since . By construction of the map
, and for
. By Proposition 7, there exists
such that and is included in
. Now is in , is in because
, and . As is a controllable sublanguage of
, it follows that is in . As
and by assumption on , is included
in . This contradicts the hypothesis that is opaque w.r.t.
and . Therefore, the proposition has been established.
Theorem 1: is the largest prefix-closed and
controllable sublanguage of s.t. is opaque w.r.t. and
.
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of Propositions
8 and 9.
Theorem 2: is a regular language.
Proof: This follows from the fact that is an au-
tomaton with set of reachable states included in the finite set
.
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With Theorems 1 and 2, we have reached the objectives an-
nounced in Sections I and IV. Namely, the control induced
by the automaton is the optimal control enforcing
the opacity of on , and this control is regular.
Example 11: The optimal control defined by the automaton
prevents the agent from using the lift of the south wing, and
it also prevents the agent from using the lift of the north wing
from the second floor to the third floor at any time after he has
used this lift downwards.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given a system modeled by a finite transition system over
, a regular secret and an adversary observing a
subset of the events of , we have addressed the
problem of computing the supremal controller that enforces the
opacity of on while observing and controlling respective
subsets and of events of . Assuming that
, we have shown that this supremal controller is reg-
ular. The question is open whether the supremal controller is
still regular and effectively computable when and are
not comparable. We would like to add that the control synthesis
algorithm which has been proposed can be easily adapted to
enforce the joint opacity of several regular secrets
(recognized by corresponding subsets of states
of ). This may serve, e.g., to hide the current position of a
token traveling through a graph with vertices, or to stipulate
that no bit of a secret data byte should be leaked (by requiring
the joint opacity of some predicate representing this data byte
and of the complementary predicate). This covers also the no-
tion of secrecy as defined in [26]. The non-blocking property of
supervisors was ignored in this work. However, under full ob-
servation (i.e. when ), a straightforward adaptation of
our work suffices to enforce also the deadlock-freeness of the
controlled system . It suffices indeed to state in Definition
9 that is undefined whenever and some
deadlocked configuration can be reached from by
some uncontrollable sequence of events .7
Many applications in which security issues cannot be ignored
deal with infinite data types. Such systems or services are natu-
rally modeled with infinite transition systems. In order to avoid
that confidential information leaks from such infinite systems, it
seems important to investigate combined techniques of opacity
control and abstract interpretation. A possible scheme is to en-
force opacity by supervisory control on finite abstractions of in-
finite systems and then to lift control to the original systems for
subsequent model-checking.
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